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I. INTRODUCTION

A strong tension between the guarantee of free speech 1 and the
legitimate need for secrecy in matters of national security has traditionally marked American jurisprudence.2 Recently, this tension has
clearly created conflict in the cloak and dagger world of international
espionage. Over the past decade, the number of Americans exposed
as covert agents has increased at a dramatic rate.3 This increase, in
large part, results from deliberate efforts of Americans determined to
hamper the effectiveness of the Central Intelligence Agency as an in1. This guarantee is embodied in the first amendment. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONsT. amend. I. The first ten
amendments to the Constitution compose "the bill of rights" which was passed by Congress on
Sept. 25, 1789 and ratified on Dec. 15, 1791. U.S. CONsT. amend. I-X.
2. See Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981) (revocation of passport for revealing identities of
CIA agents is constitutional); Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (holding CIA employee breached fiduciary duty by publishing book without government clearance); New York
Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (constitutionality of prohibiting prior restraint
of Pentagon papers publication); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (upholding conviction of Communist party leaders on grounds that they posed clear and present danger); Near
v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (in dicta, suggesting for the first time a national security
exception to free speech); United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979)
(prohibition of publication of hydrogen bomb data), appeal dismissed, 610 F.2d 819 (7th Cir.
1979).
3. Since 1975, over 3,000 alleged CIA agents have been publicly identified. S. REP. No.
201, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 145, 151-52.
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ternational mechanism.' These exposures have not only undermined
the efficiency of the United States intelligence establishment, but
have also amplified the threat of physical violence to foreign operatives.5 Congress reacted to these exposures by enacting, with both
Presidential and bipartisan approval, the Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982 [the Act].'
The government hoped that the new law would work to derail the
cannonballing threat of strategic disaster which the continuing exposures were generating. 7 In constructing a law which would satisfy national security needs, however, Congress had to operate within first
amendment constraints. Although both the executive and legislative
branches have concluded that the Act successfully accommodates
both the requirements of the first amendment and the demands of
national security,8 that belief is not universal" and several commentators have criticized the statute and seriously questioned its
constitutionality. 10
The judiciary, however, has yet to pass final judgment on the
Act. 1 In making this judgment, the courts will have two lines of inquiry open to them. Each requires the government to offer a justification for overriding first amendment protections. The first focuses on
the state's showing of a compelling interest, while the second requires
a showing that the affected speech creates a clear and present danger
to the public.
This note will begin with a brief look at the history and reasoning
4. Id.
5. See 444 U.S. at 512; infra notes 19-28 and accompanying text. See also S. REP. No. 201,
97th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprintedin 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 145, 152.
6. Pub. L. No. 97-200, 96 Stat. 122 (1982), amending The National Security Act of 1947 (to
be codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 421-426). Both the Reagan and Carter Administrations supported
the enactment of this statute and it passed both the Democratic controlled House and the
Republican controlled Senate. It had over 40 co-sponsors from both sides of the aisle in the
Senate alone. See S. REP. No. 201, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 145, 149-50.
7. S. REP. No. 201, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
145, 152.
8. S. REP. No. 201, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 14-15, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS

145, 158-59.

9. See S. REP. No. 201, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 145, 149 (the threat of a lengthy filibuster by opponents in the Senate kept the bill from
reaching the floor during the second session of the 96th Congress).
10. See, e.g., Note, The Intelligence Identities ProtectionAct of 1982: An Assessment of
the Constitutionalityof Section 601(c), 49 BROOKLYN L. REV. 479 (1983) [hereinafter cited as
Identities ProtectionAct: Constitutionalityof Section 601(c)]; Note, The Constitutionalityof
the Intelligence Identities Protection Act, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 727 (1983) [hereinafter cited as
Constitutionalityof the Identities Protection Act].
11. Challenge of the Act appears imminent. In reaction to the Act, Philip Agee, editor of
Counter-spy magazine, announced that he was suspending his routine of exposing CIA operatives until the statute was tested in the courts. N.Y. Times, Mar. 13, 1982, § A, at 11, col. 1.
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behind the Act. Next, the relevant first amendment tenets will be
discussed. These tenets will then be applied to the Act in an effort to
determine its constitutional status. Finally, the Act will be inspected
for any fatal overbreadth infirmities. The note concludes that, under
either the compelling interest or the present danger test, the Act constitutes a permissible speech restriction.
II.BACKGROUND TO THE ACT

A. HistoricalPerspective
Congress enacted the National Security Act of 194712 to create a
"comprehensive program for the future security of the United
States."13 The Act itself seemed largely a reaction to both the lessons
learned during World War II concerning America's peacetime
preparedness and the perceived threats from abroad which had
lingered long after the dust had settled over Germany and Japan.
Among the more significant creations of that Act were the National
Security Council,' 4 a unified Department of Defense,15 and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).16 By the late 1970's, however, repeated dramatic media exposures of covert CIA operations led to the
formation of dissident groups at home and abroad dedicated to the
abolition of the Agency.' 7 Subsequently, the wholesale exposure of
CIA operatives began.""
In 1975, the editors of CounterSpy magazine identified Richard
Welch, the CIA's station chief in Athens, as an American intelligence
agent. 9 Less than a month after publication of this information,
12. 50 U.S.C. §§ 401-403 (1976).
13. Id. § 401.
14. Id. § 402.
15. Id. §§ 401, 410.
16. Id. § 403.
17. Public criticism of the CIA rose dramatically as evidence became available concerning
the organization's involvement in various questionable activities ranging from Watergate to a
coup in Chile. See, e.g., 127 CONG. REC. H6504 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1981) (statement of Rep.
Weiss suggesting link between Cuban participants in Watergate burglary and the CIA). See
also S. REP. No. 201, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprinted in 1982 US. CODE CONG. & AD.NEws
145, 151.
18. For instance, The Covert Action Information Bulletin, published six times per year
and operating out of Washington, D.C., has over 6,000 subscribers and features exposis on
alleged CIA covert operations abroad as well as lists naming "suspected" CIA agents. Taubman,
Gadfly Exposes C.I.A.'s Covert Activities and Agents, N.Y. Times, July 10, 1980, § A, at 12,
col. 1.
19. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 24, 1975, § A, at 10, col. 4; Halperin, CIA News Management,
Washington Post, Jan. 23, 1977, § C, at 2, col. 3. See also S. REP. No. 201, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.
8, reprintedin 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.NEws 145, 152.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1984

3

Florida Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 4 [1984], Art. 6
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXVI

Welch was murdered in front of his Athens home.2 ° While CounterSpy's editor, Philip Agee, emphatically denied any responsibility for
the murder, both the White House and the CIA insisted the publication indirectly caused Welch's death.2 '
In 1980, the editor of the Covert Action Information Bulletin,
Louis Wolf, called a news conference in which he revealed the identities of fifteen alleged CIA agents working out of the U.S. embassy in
Kingston, Jamaica. 22 Wolfe revealed not only names, but also addresses, telephone numbers, and the color and license plate numbers
of automobiles. 23 Less than forty-eight hours after the news conference, the home of one of the named officials was sprayed with machine gun fire.24 Several nights later an unsuccessful attack was
launched upon the home of another of the officials named at the conference. 25 As a result of these attacks, the State Department had no
choice but to remove all the targeted officials and their families from
Jamaica.26
In 1981, the pro-Sandinista newspaper Nuevo Diario identified
thirteen alleged CIA agents assigned to the U.S. embassy in Managua, Nicaragua.27 A number of them received death threats and were
attacked in their homes. As in Jamaica, several families had to be
evacuated from the country. United States officials in Managua
maintained that the publication of these names was linked with a
visit by Philip Agee to Nicaragua.2 8
These "namings of names" were hardly isolated incidents. Exposures occurred around the globe 29 with increasing regularity from
20.
21.
NEWS

See N.Y. Times, supra note 19, at 1, col. 2; Halperin, supra note 19, at 2. col. 3.
S. REP. No. 201, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.

145, 151-52.

22. N.Y. Times, July 5, 1980, § A, at 1, col. 5; Note, Open Secrets: Protecting the Identity of the CIA's Intelligence Gatherersin a FirstAmendment Society, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 1723,
1724 n.8 (1981) (restating an address by Stansfield Turner, Director of the CIA, to the San
Francisco Press Club on Aug. 11, 1980).
23. S. REP. No. 201, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS

145, 152.

24.
25.
NEWS

Id. See also N.Y. Times, July 5, 1980, § A, at 1, col. 5.
S. REP. No. 201, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.

145, 152.

26. Id. Replacement of uncovered personnel is both difficult and expensive. Id. at 153.
27. 128 Cong. Rec. S1168 (daily ed. Feb. 25, 1982) (statement of Senator Goldwater).
28. Id.
29. In 1982, six Americans were expelled from Mozambique on charges of espionage. The
expulsion followed visits to Mozambique by agents of the Cuban Intelligence Service and the
editors of the Covert Action Information Bulletin. S. REP. No. 201, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 8,
reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 145, 152. In addition, in 1981, two American
officials of the American Institute for Free Labor Development were assassinated in El Salvador following an extensive discussion of the organization as a CIA front by Philip Agee in his
book, INSIDE THE COMPANY: CIA DIARY. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 15, 1981, § A, at 10, col. 4-5.
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1975 to 1982. Two of the better known perpetrators, Agee and Wolf,
claimed to have personally exposed a total of over 3,000 covert operatives during the 1970's.30 Prior to this rash of exposures, Agee made
his objectives clear. He announced that his "campaign" was to have
two major goals. The first goal was to force CIA officers and agents
out of the countries where they were operating by exposing their CIA
links. The second was to have the CIA altogether abolished. 31
Because such disclosures were unforeseen by the drafters of the
National Security Act, the legislation contained no provision capable
of coping with the strategic disaster the CIA faced. The only legislation even arguably applicable was the decades-old group of laws
known as the "espionage statutes"3 2 and a miscellaneous statute covering theft of government property.3 3 Both, however, were believed
largely inapplicable to the publication of identities.3 4 Recognizing
both the lack of recourse under existing law and the rapidly mounting damage to America's intelligence network, Congress began debating proposed amendments to the National Security Act of 1947 in
1979. 35 From 1979 to 1980, various bills and amendments were raised,
considered, and subsequently dropped. 36 In 1981, however, legislative
discussion of the bills was revived and resulted in passage of the Intelligence Protection Act of 1982. 37
30. In addition to being editor of CounterSpy magazine, Philip Agee is also contributing
editor of the Covert Action Information Bulletin. See supra note 18. Agee claims to have revealed over 1,000 CIA agents over the years. Likewise, Wolf, editor of the Covert Action Information Bulletin, claims to have publicly identified over 2,000 agents. S. REP. No. 201, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprintedin 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 145, 151-52.
31. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 283 n.2 (1981). See also Identities ProtectionAct: Constitutionality of Section 601(c), supra note 10, at 480 n.2.
32.

18 U.S.C. §§ 793-798 (1982).

33.

18 U.S.C. § 641 (1982).

34.' See Edgar & Schmidt, The Espionage Statutes and Publicationof Defense Information, 73 COLUm L. REV. 929 (1973). See also S. REP. No. 201, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprintedin
1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 145, 152; United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908,
924 (4th Cir. 1980) (concerning application of 18 U.S.C. § 641 to classfied national defense
information), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1144 (1982).
35. See, e.g., H.R. 5615, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); S.2216, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980);
S.2284, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980). See also Note, "Naming Names": UnauthorizedDisclosure
693 (1981).
vREv.
of Intelligence Agent's Identities, 33 STAN. L.
36. The 1982 Act is largely similar and directly descended from a family of bills introduced during the 96th Congress. See supra note 35. See also N.Y. Times, Apr. 8, 1981, § A, at
14, col. 1. For a history and evaluation of the meaning of these bills see Edgar & Schmidt,
supra note 34.
37. The House began reconsideration of the protection measures on September 23, 1981
and the Senate followed suit on March 18, 1982. The final bill was passed by the House on June
3, 1982 and by the Senate on March 10, 1982. 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEws 145, 152.
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B. The Act and Its Reasoning
38
The Act sets out three classifications of substantive offenses,
each based upon the perpetrator's access to classified information
and the nature of the disclosure."9 The severity of the criminal penalties varies directly with the nexus between the intelligence agency
and the perpetrator. 0 Sections 601(a) and (b) address disclosures of
information, either directly or indirectly revealing a covert agent's
identity, made by present or former U.S. government employees to
unauthorized persons.4
While critics have attacked the Act as a whole, there has been
little argument as to the validity of the first two sections.4 2 This acceptance is premised on judicial recognition that the employment relationship creates a fiduciary duty on the part of an employee not to
betray his or her employer's confidences.4 3 The standard CIA practice
of requiring employees exposed to sensitive classified material to sign

38. The Act's substantive provisions, contained in § 601 (to be codified at 50 U.S.C.
§ 421) are as follows:
(a) Whoever, having or having had authorized access to classified information that identifies a covert agent, intentionally discloses any information identifying such covert agent
to any individual not authorized to receive classified information, knowing that the information disclosed so identifies such covert agent and that the United States is taking
affirmative measures to conceal such covert agent's intelligence relationship to the
United States, shall be fined not more than $50,000 or imprisoned not more than ten
years, or both. (b) Whoever, as a result of having authorized access to classified information, learns the identity of a covert agent and intentionally discloses any information
identifying such covert agent to any individual not authorized to receive classified information, knowing that the information disclosed so identifies such covert agent and that
the United States is taking affirmative measures to conceal such covert agent's intelligence relationship to the United States, shall be fined not more than $25,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. (c) Whoever, in the course of a pattern of activities intended to identify and expose covert agents and with reason to believe that such
activities would impair or impede the foreign intelligence activities of the United States,
discloses any information that identifies an individual as a covert agent to any individual
not authorized to receive classified information, knowing that the information disclosed
so identifies such individual and that the United States is taking affirmative measures to
conceal such individual's classified intelligence relationship to the United States, shall be
fined not more than $15,000 or imprisoned not more than three years, or both.
Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. § 421(a), (b). The term "covert agent" embraces not only "secret agent" per se,
but all United States intelligence officers, informants and sources as well. See § 606 of the Act
(to be codified at 50 U.S.C. § 426).
42. See, e.g., supra note 10.
43. See, e.g., Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 507-08 (1980); Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. v.
Colby, 509 F.2d 1362, 1370 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 992 (1975); United States v.
Marchetti, 446 F.2d 1309, 1318 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972). See also Note,
Constitutionality of the Identities ProtectionAct, supra note 10, at 732.
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secrecy oaths reinforces this concept of a fiduciary duty." The courts
have upheld the validity of these agreements in several instances.
In United States v. Marchetti,45 for example, a former employee
of the Central Intelligence Agency planned to publish a book recounting his experiences while an intelligence agent. 4" Upon joining
the Agency in 1955, he had signed a secrecy agreement in which he
promised "not to divulge in any way any classified information, intelligence, or knowledge, except in the performances of his duties, unless specifically authorized ... by the Director or his authorized representative. ' 47 Marchetti signed a second such oath upon his
resignation in 1969.48
In granting an injunction against Marchetti, the appellate court
affirmed the validity of the secrecy agreement. 49 The court observed
the first amendment limited the degree of secrecy which the govern50
ment could impose, contractually or otherwise, on its employees.
The court noted, however, that the first amendment was not intended to act as a bludgeon with which to shatter the remainder of
the Constitution.5 1
The CIA's gathering of intelligence is within the President's constitutionally designated responsibility to safeguard the nation's security. 52 While citizens have the right to speak out and criticize the government, the government has the duty to strive for internal secrecy
when disclosure could damage national interests.5 3 Secrecy agreements, the Marchetti court held, are reasonable means for the CIA to
protect its intelligence network. Thus, while an individual accepting
employment with the Agency does not surrender his first amendment
rights, the government can constitutionally prevent the disclosure of
classified information.
The Fourth Circuit's holding was not unique.5 4 Following
Marchetti, other courts reinforced the principle that government em44. See supra note 43.
45. 466 F.2d 1309 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972).
46. Id. at 1313. Previously, Marchetti had written a novel dealing with a fictional agency
known as the "National Intelligence Agency," as well as several magazine articles critical of the
CIA which recounted some of his experiences while with that agency. Id.
47. Id. at 1312.
48. Id. Before resigning, Marchetti had served as Executive Assistant to the Deputy Director. Id.
49. Id. at 1318.
50. Id. at 1313.
51. Id. at 1314.
52. Id. at 1315.
53. Id.
54. See, e.g., Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 507-08 (1980); Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. v.
Colby, 509 F.2d 1362, 1370 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 992 (1975); Marchetti, 466 F.2d at
1318.
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ployees were subject to more restrictions on their first amendment
rights than were citizens in the private sector. 5 By executing secrecy
oaths in consideration for government employment, CIA employees
effectively renounced any right to disclose classified information.5
In Snepp v. United States,57 the nation's highest court acknowledged Agency secrecy oaths as valid contracts.58 In Snepp, however,
the information which the defendant was seeking to expose was unclassified." Nevertheless, the Court held that because Snepp had
agreed not to divulge any information whatsoever without prepublication clearance from the Agency, he was prohibited from writing
books disclosing the unclassified data.6 0 Thus the Snepp Court upheld a limited prior restraint, via pre-screening procedures, of even
unclassified information."'
The fiduciary relationship upon which the Marchetti and Snepp
decisions were based 2 is equally applicable to government employees
when no secrecy agreement exists. As long as the employee learns the
identity of the agent through authorized access to classified information, an implied fiduciary duty to safeguard that information clearly
exists. The breach of faith in this context is little different in principle from employee treachery in the private sector companies wronged
by employees who misappropriate their secret formulas or customer
63
lists often prevail in trade secret protection suits.
55. See, e.g., Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980).
56. 466 F.2d at 1316.
57. 444 U.S. 507 (1980).
58. Id. at 509.
59. Id. at 510. See also 466 F.2d at 1318; Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. v. Kolby, 509 F.2d 1362,
1370 (4th Cir.) (where only classified information was restricted), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 992
(1975).
60. Snepp, 444 U.S. at 510-.1.
61. Id.
62. A recurring theme in the House and Senate debates over the Intelligence Act was
while imperfect security was not to be considered by defendants as a trigger injecting the information into the public domain, the Executive Branch had the primary responsibility of "keeping the lid on" sensitive data. See Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982, Pub. L. No.
97-200, § 603, 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (96 Stat.) 122 (to be codified at 50 U.S.C.
§ 423). See also S. REP. No. 201, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 23-24, reprintedin 1982 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 145, 167-68. This was to be accomplished not by unilaterally relying on the Intelligence Act, but rather by internally tightening security procedures within the Agency. See S.
REP. No. 201, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 10, reprintedin 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 145, 154.
The fiduciary relationship found to exist in the Marchetti and Snepp cases is based upon the
trust the government necessarily extends to the personnel within the bureaucracy. Marchetti,
466 F.2d at 1317; Snepp, 444 U.S. at 510-11. A government cannot function without at least a
number of key personnel having access to sensitive information. Moreover, few types of government employment involve a higher degree of trust than CIA employment. Snepp, 444 U.S. at
511.
63. The RESTATEMENT.(SEco14D) OF AGENCY § 396 (1958) states that after the termination
of the agency relationship, the former agent has a duty not to disclose customer lists or other
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Because there is no fiduciary relationship between the government and nonemployees, critics have been less willing to accept the
constitutionality of section 601(c). 6 4 Despite the lack of fiduciary
duty, however, Congress realized that unless the Act covered government outsiders it would be largely ineffective. 5 So unlike its sister
sections, section 601(c) is aimed at exposures by persons not privy to
classified information via legitimate, authorized access.6 6 Congress,
however, incorporated two additional criteria into into section
601(c). 6 7 These criteria were not seen as necessary to insure the constitutionality of section 601(a) or (b). Before a conviction can stand
under section 601(c), the government must prove: (1) the disclosure
was made in the course of a pattern of activities intended to identify
and expose covert agents;68 and, (2) the defendant engaged in the exposures with reason to believe that his actions would impair or impede U.S. foreign intelligence activities. 9 Congress included the two
additional elements as a safety valve, both in order to remain within
the confines of constitutionality and to ensure that the Act did not
lead to undue regulation of the news media. 70 With these restrictions
in- mind, the constitutionality of section 601(c) should now be
considered.
confidential information to third persons when the confidential information was given to him
for the principal's use and disclosure would injure the principal's interests.
64. See, e.g., Note, Constitutionalityof the Identities Protection Act, supra note 10, at
754; Note, Identities ProtectionAct: Constitutionalityof Section 601(c), supranote 10, at 515.
65. While Philip Agee, as a former employee of the CIA could be reached under § 601(a)
or (b), Louis Wolf, who was never employed by the Agency, would be free to continue with his
"wanton disclosures." See generally S. REP. No. 201, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprinted in 1982
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 145, 151-52 (focus on punishment of "leaks" disclosing identity of
undercover employees).
66. To be codified at 50 U.S.C. § 421(c). For the precise wording of this section see supra
note 38.
67. See supra note 38.
68. The legislation defined the term "pattern of activities" as "a series of acts with a
common purpose or objective." See § 606(10) of The Intelligence Identities Protection Act of
1982, Pub. L. No. 97-200, 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEws (96 Stat.) 122 (to be codified at 50
U.S.C. § 426(10)). Disclosures must be part of a purposeful enterprise of revealing names in
order to meet this element. See S. REP. No. 201, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 20-21, reprintedin 1982
US. CODE CONG. & An. NEws 145, 164-65. While the defendant would have to be in the business
of naming names, a pattern of activities does not necessarily mean a pattern of disclosures.
First disclosures are punishable if some requisite pattern of activities precedes the disclosure
and if the other elements are met. See HR. REP. No. 221, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 8-9, reprintedin
1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEws 170, 173.
69. Id. See also S. REP. No. 201, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 20, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE
CONG. & An. NEWS 145, 164; HR. REP. No. 221, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprinted in 1982 U.S.
CODE CONG. & An. NEws 170, 172.
70. See S. REP. No. 201, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 20-21, reprintedin 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. &
An. NEws 145, 164-65.
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FIRST AMENDMENT CONSIDERATIONS

Historically, courts have zealously guarded first amendment guarantees.7 1 The first amendment generally denies government the
power to restrict expression because of its message, ideas, subject
matter, or content.72 While the first amendment is a favored amendment, however, it does not afford absolute protection and must yield
under certain conditions. 3 Speech may lose its protected status due
to either the intent of the speaker or the context surrounding the
statements.74 In determining the line between protected and unprotected speech, one must, therefore, exactingly
examine all the circum75
utterances.
the
stances surrounding
71. Garvin v. Rosenau, 455 F.2d 233, 239 (6th Cir. 1972).
72. See, e.g., Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 99 (1972) (first amendment
denies the government the power to restrict expression because of its message, ideas, or subject
matter); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 556 n.14 (1965) (statute banning all street assemblies
and parades with an exception for labor picketing exceeds mere traffic regulation and unconstitutionally restricts expression).
73. See, e.g., Mazzella v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 479 F. Supp. 523, 526 (E.D.N.Y.
1979) (no absolute right of privilege protects newsmen).
Rarely has it been suggested that the first amendment bestows absolute amnesty for the
acts of every unscrupulous individual who may claim its protection. United States v. Smith, 414
F.2d 630, 633 (5th Cir. 1969), rev'd on other grounds, Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58
(1970). Commentators have reflected upon the true reach of the first amendment since the day
it was first drafted. As one such commentator noted over 60 years ago: "Amid the uncomplicated conditions of frontier life it was entirely feasible to assure each individual a certain quantum of 'inalienable rights,' but [today] the pursuit of happiness has become a joint-stock enterprise in which the welfare of all is embarked." Corwin, Freedom of Speech and Press Under
the First Amendment: A Rgsumg, 30 YALE L.J. 48, 55 (1920).
74. See, e.g., United States v. Cerone, 452 F.2d 274, 286 (7th Cir. 1971) (computation of
illegal gambling point spreads not protected by first amendment), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 964
(1972).
75. See generally Gish v. Board of Educ. of the Borough of Paramus, Bergen County, 145
N.J. Super. 96, 104, 366 A.2d 1337, 1341 (1976) (whether speech may be restricted depends on
many factors), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 879 (1977); People v. Weeks, 197 Colo. 175, 591 P.2d 91
(1979) (right of free speech depends on content and context); State v. A Motion Picture Entitled "The Bet," 219 Kan. 64, 547 P.2d 760 (1976) (line between regulatable and non-regulatable
is fine and calls for delicate use of sensitive tool); White v. State, 330 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1976) (to
determine line, one must examine all relevant circumstances); People v. Hinman, 86 Misc. 2d
685, 383 N.Y.S.2d 498 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1976) (content regulation generally considered a constitutional taboo); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (content regulation subject to exacting
scrutiny). For cases illustrating that this scrutiny can vary from medium to medium and from
context to context, see Wolston v. Readers Digest Ass'n, Inc., 429 F. Supp. 167 (D.D.C. 1977)
(qualified privilege applies to authors and publishers of books as well as to the press), afj'd, 578
F.2d 427 (D.C. Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 443 U.S. 157 (1979); Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, Colo., 660 F.2d 1370 (10th Cir. 1981) (cable TV requires a different standard but first amendment does apply), cert. dismissed, 456 U.S. 1001 (1982); Columbia
Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973) (radio and TV broadcasters using limited and valuable resources are subject to a different standard than the press);
Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (city's interest in planning and regulating
the use of property for commercial purposes is adequate to support ordinance regulating adult
theatre locations); Jaffe v. Alexis, 659 F.2d 1018 (9th Cir. 1981) (state has burden to justify
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A. The Compelling Interest Test
First amendment analysis involves a balancing of competing interests. While first amendment rights have been held to comfortably
override such considerations as public convenience or public opinion,76 speech may be restricted when a compelling government interest is involved.7 7 As the term "compelling" implies, the asserted interest must possess a weight and magnitude substantial enough to
override the pro-first amendment presumption.
1. The Government's Interest
In balancing the conflicting demands of national security and free
speech, the courts have tended to resolve the conflict in favor of the
government.7 8 In Near v. Minnesota,9 the Supreme Court laid the
foundation for the "national security exception" to the rule against
prior restraint of speech.8 0 In Near, the Court dealt with a publisher
discrimination between speakers in forums generally available to the public); Cable News Network, Inc. v. American Broadcasting Co., 518 F. Supp. 1238 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (whether speech is
protected or not often depends on its context).
76. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam)
(any governmental attempt to restrict expression by prior restraint is presumed to be unconstitutional and government carries burden of proof).
77. See Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981) (no government interest is more compelling
than national security); Smith v. Daily Mail Pub. Co., 443 U.S. 97, 102 (1979) (both prior restraints and subsequent restraints require a compelling state interest to sustain validity); New
York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 715 (1971) (government failed to carry burden
of proof showing overriding state interest); Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S.
415, 419 (1971) (respondent failed to carry burden of justifying imposition of prior restraint of
distribution of informational materials); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713 (1931) (statute
was the essence of censorship and furthered no legitimate compelling interest); KQED v.
Houchins, 546 F.2d 284, 286 (9th Cir. 1976) (can only restrict speech if furthering a substantial
state interest and is the least drastic means to do so), rev'd on othergrounds, 438 U.S. 1 (1978);
Mitchell v. King, 537 F.2d 385, 391 (10th Cir. 1976) (it is fundamental that limitation of speech
is permissible where needed to meet state's substantial interests); Forcade v. Knight, 416 F.
Supp. 1025, 1035 (D.D.C. 1976), aff'd in part, Sherrill v. Knight, 569 F.2d 124 (D.C. Cir. 1977);
Graham v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 126 So. 2d 133, 135 (Fla. 1960) (compelling
interest exception to free speech now well established).
78. The "national security exception" to the rule against speech restriction was first formulated in Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931). Since that time, the doctrine has been
invoked frequently by the government. See, e.g., Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981) (revocation
of passport for revealing identity of covert agents); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, rehg
denied, 393 U.S. 900 (1968) (sustaining conviction for burning draft card in draft protest); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (upholding conviction of Communist Party leaders on
basis they posed a clear and present danger); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919)
(pamphlet opposing draft constituted clear and present danger to war effort). But see New
York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam) (prohibiting prior restraint
of Pentagon Papers); United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967) (invalidating blank prohibition of employment of communists in defense plants).
79. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
80. Id. at 716. While Near dealt with prior restraints on speech, and the Intelligence Act
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who had been convicted of publishing defamatory material in violation of a Minnesota law forbidding such publication.8 ' Although Near
struck down the statute in question, the Supreme Court made it clear
that while prior restraints are generally unacceptable, exceptions involving such circumstances as national security, obscenity, privacy,
and seditious activities might be tolerated. s2 The Court recognized
that "in time of war no one would question but that the government
might prevent actual obstruction to its recruiting service or the publication of the sailing dates of transports or the number and location
of troops."8 " Over the years, the national security exception to the
rule against prior restraints has been unanimously embraced by
American courts and today it is treated as a given.8 4
The Supreme Court in Near referred to the national security exception in time of war. rhe Court made it clear that if a nation was
at war, statements which might be made freely in peacetime could so
hinder the nation's war effort that no court could reasonably regard
them as protected by any constitutional provision. 6 The distinction
between war and peace is much more blurred today, though, than in
the 1930's. Neither of the polar extremes of total war or total peace
has been present in the United States for at least several decades.
Our nation is, on the other hand, in a kind of of perpetual state of
emergency with regard to the Soviet Union. Actions taken by the
deals with subsequent restraints, the logic is the same. Both methods are disfavored due to the
possible chilling effect on protected speech. The distinction is not generally dispositive because
both require "the highest form of state interest" in order to be upheld. Smith v. Daily Mail
Pub. Co., 443 U.S. 97, 102 (1979). Even so, prior restraints tend to be even more strongly disfavored than subsequent restraints due to the theory that while the latter may chill first amendment rights, the former freezes them. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976).
Accordingly, the analysis of both is the same, but subsequent restraints, as a practical matter,
might well survive judicial scrutiny under circumstances in which a prior restraint might fail.
81. Near, 283 U.S. at 697.
82. Id. at 716.
83. Id. The analogy to the present discussion is persuasive. The wholesale exposures have
interfered with the CIA's recruitment and retention of operatives. See Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S.
280, 308-09 (1981). Moreover, the listing of names and stations of CIA operatives is substantially similar to giving out the "location of troops."
84. See Knoll, National Security: The Ultimate Threat to the First Amendment, 66
MINN. L. REV. (1981). Knoll was the editor of The Progressive, the magazine enjoined from
publication of hydrogen bomb data in United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990
(W.D. Wis.), appeal dismissed, 610 F.2d 819 (7th Cir. 1979). Even Knoll acknowledged that
"Chief Justice Hughes exaggerated only slightly when he assumed in Near that 'no one would
question' infringement of the first amendment to protect military secrets in time of war. Few
would have questioned such censorship a half century ago, and I suspect even fewer would do
so today." Knoll further admitted that the national security exception is treated as an "unwritten addendum to the first amendment," taken for granted in both legal and journalistic circles.
Knoll, supra at 164.
85. Near, 283 U.S. at 716.
86. Id.
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United States in response to the Soviet threat have spanned the
gamut of the military, economic and political spectrums.8 7
Additionally, there has been a perpetual cascade of international
upheavals and crises largely beyond the generic NATO-WARSAW
PACT antagonism. Some of these crises have drawn U.S. ground
forces into shooting wars on foreign soil, such as the multi-national
invasion of Grenada and the stationing of peacekeeping forces in
Lebanon.88 Others have had a less direct, if not less dramatic, impact
on American interests such as the civil uprisings in Angola, Iran, Afghanistan, and El Salvador as well as the threat to accessible supplies
of vital raw materials caused by general political instability in the
Middle East and Southern Africa.
In the 1971 decision of New York Times Co. v. United States,8 9
the Supreme Court made clear that the existence of war did not free
the government from all first amendment restrictions. The decision
did, however, reaffirm the power of Congress to pass legislation
designed to protect the nation's security. New York Times concerned
Daniel Ellsberg's release to the press of a secret, governmentallycompiled, historical analysis of America's involvement in the Vietnam War.9 0 When the two defendant newspapers began publishing
the analysis, the Federal Government moved for an injunction. The
government claimed the reports would reveal top secret information,
and irreparably damage U.S. security interests. 91
The Court, however, found little support for the government's
contention that U.S. security interests would be harmed. First, the
government had to acknowledge that while all the documents were
classified as top secret, there had been a massive and indiscriminate
87.

See Forkosch, Speech and Press in National Emergencies, 18 GONZ. L. REv. 1, 23-25

(1983). Some illustrative examples include: the resistance to communist adventurism in Korea
and Vietnam; joint military operations with the Western allies in NATO; U.S. troops poised in
West Germany, facing the Iron Curtain; the stationing of military personnel in approximately
117 countries worldwide; preparations for possible use of laser weapons in outer space; boycotts
of pipeline equipment and grain destined for Soviet ports; and the breakoff of arms control
negotiations. Id. at 24 n.56.

88. The multinational force, led by the United States, landed on the shores of the island
nation of Grenada on Oct. 27, 1983 in order to prevent the leftist government from becoming a

Cuban satellite. During the invasion, several hundred Cuban troops engaged American forces in
the first direct battle between American and Cuban troops since the latter had become a sovereign nation. Mullin, Why the Surprise Move in Grenada-and What Next?, 95, no. 19, U.S.
NEws & WORLD REP. 31 (1983). In Lebanon, American Marines, originally sent to Beirut as part
of a multinational peacekeeping force, came increasingly under hostile fire and suffered several
hundred casualties before they were evacuated. See Lebanon Pullout-The SpreadingImpact,
96, no. 7, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP. 28 (1984).
89. 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
90. See Oakes, The Doctrine of PriorRestraint Since the PentagonPapers, 15 U. MIiC.
J.L. REF. 497, 500 (1982).
91. Id. at 500-01.
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over-classification of the material.9 2 Second, the documents did not
discuss matters occurring after 1968. With over two years having
passed, most of the 7,000 pages were now "truly water over the
dam." 93 In short, the government failed to show with any certainty
that the public exposure of the text posed any grave or immediate
danger to the ongoing war effort in Vietnam.94 On the other hand,
reasoned the Court, the publication of the historical information
could greatly assist the ongoing public debate into the origins of
American involvement in an increasingly unpopular war.95
The Supreme Court's three paragraph per curiam decision, which
simply declared the government had failed to meet its burden of
overcoming the presumption against prior restraints,96 has been
widely cited as a general condemnation of prior restraints on free
speech.97 The concurrences which accompanied the short per curiam
opinion, however, indicate that such a general condemnation may exaggerate the true intent of the decision. The concurrences also offer
insight into the judicial scrutiny potentially faced by the Intelligence
Act.98 The concurrence of Justice Stewart, for example, stressed the
legitimacy of secrecy in matters of national security. "[I]t is elementary," the Justice wrote, "that the successful conduct of international
diplomacy and the maintenance of an effective national defense requires both confidentiality and secrecy."9 Stewart went on to explain
92. Id. at 503.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 504.
95. Id.
96. New York Times Co., 403 U.S. at 714.
97. See, e.g., United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990, 994 (W.D. Wis.) (distinguishing New York Times Co.), appeal dismissed, 619 F.2d 819 (7th Cir. 1979). See also Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 555 (1975) (musical production prohibited
prior to performance due to anticipation the show would violate the law) (citing to White, J.,
concurring).
98. The New York Times decision was a 6-3 split, with Justices Black, Douglas, Stewart,
Brennan, White and Marshall voting with the majority and Justices Burger, Harlan and Blackmun dissenting. Justices Black and Douglas have long been acknowledged as first amendment
absolutionists. The absolutist view of free speech is that "at no time, in any place, for any
reason, under any circumstances, can the government impose any restriction or limitation on
speech or press." See Forkosch, supra note 87, at 8. Under such a view, a person could falsely
shout fire in a crowded theatre, or publish troop movements in time of war. Id. See also Cahn,
Justice Black and First Amendment "Absolutes": A Public Interview, 37 N.Y.U. L. REv. 549
(1962); Kalven, Upon Reading Mr. Justice Black on the First Amendment, 14 U.C.L.A_ L. REv.
428 (1967). The absolutist viewpoint, however, has never held sway with a majority of the Supreme Court. Accordingly, the first amendment has never been construed as preventing the
Chief Executive from carrying out his obligation of protecting the United States. See supra
notes 77-84 and accompanying text.
99. New York Times Co., 403 U.S. 713, 728 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Stewart went
on to say that "[Olther nations can hardly deal with this Nation in an atmosphere of mutual
trust unless they can be assured their confidences will be kept. And within our own executive
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that, while he believed the primary duty to ensure secrecy rested
with the Executive through the promulgation and enforcement of executive regulations,10 0 Congress and the courts had a role to play as
well. Justice Stewart acknowledged that legislation protecting national security and government secrecy was well within the government's power.101
Other concurrences also supported the validity of congressional
legislation designed to protect national security. Justice White
stressed the need for legislation based on independent congressional
investigations and findings.10 2 Justice Marshall's concurrence also focused primarily on the lack of congressional action in the area. Justice Marshall believed it inconsistent with the concept of separation
of powers for the Court to use its power to prevent behavior Congress
had declined to prohibit.10 3 The Intelligence Act and its voluminous
legislative history make it clear Congress has definitively addressed
these concerns, and spoken in the area of covert identity protection.
Although the New York Times decision, at first glance, might
seem to allow the release of sensitive information, the decision, taken
as a whole, suggests that the Intelligence Act was a valid exercise of
congressional power. First, the concurrences and the dissents indicate
that the Act is likely to be scrutinized by a receptive court.104 Second,
the threat to national security which the Intelligence Act addresses is
unlike the threat discussed in New York Times and is of a magnitude
likely to establish a compelling interest.
Recent cases have arguably recognized the compelling nature of
this threat. In Haig v. Agee,10 5 the U.S. government reacted to Philip
Agee's campaign against the CIA by revoking Agee's passport in order to curtail his disclosure activities abroad. 10 8 Secretary of State
Haig based the action on a regulation authorizing such revocation
departments, the development of considered and intelligent international policies would be impossible if those charged with their formulation could not communicate with each other freely,
frankly, and in confidence. In the area of basic national defense the frequent need for absolute
secrecy is, of course, self evident." Id.
100. Id. at 729-30.
101. Id. at 730.
102. Id. at 732 (White, J., concurring).
103. Id. at 742 (Marshall, J., concurring).
104, See supra notes 99-103 and accompanying text. In addition to the opinions themselves, the counsel for the New York Times admitted, during oral arguments, that if American
lives were at stake the government could have clearly prevented publication. 71 P. KURLAN &
G. CASPER, LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:
CONSrrtnONAL LAW 187, 236 (1975) (oral argument of Alexander M. Bickel, Esq., on behalf of
petitioner, New York Times). Secondly, he admitted, if national security and lives were at
stake, Congress had the power to pass statutes making the reckless speech illegal. Id. at 239-41.
105. 453 U.S. 280 (1981).
106. Id. at 286.
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where the Secretary determined that a U.S. citizen's activities abroad
were causing, or were likely to cause, serious damage to U.S. foreign
policy or national security. 10 7 Agee filed suit claiming the statute violated his first amendment right to criticize government policies. In
upholding the revocation, however, the Court stated bluntly that
"[w]hile the Constitution protects against invasions of individual
rights, it is not a suicide pact."' 0 8
The Court's recognition of the importance of protecting covert op-*
eratives seems reasonable in the present international context. Despite criticism of many of the CIA's past activities, every President
since Franklin D. Roosevelt has believed the Agency was essential to
the security of the United States and its allies. 09 As Admiral Turner,
former Director of the CIA, testified to the Court in Snepp, however,
intelligence sources working with the CIA have become increasingly
nervous as exposures have soared. 1 0 Nearly every foreign intelligence
service having contact with the CIA has undertaken reviews of those
relationships. Some of the more immediate results of the continuing
disclosures include reductions in contacts, hesitance to engage in
joint operations, and a marked reduction in exchange of information."' These results are quite understandable. Many of our most
valuable sources of intelligence live in societies which, if contacts
with the West were revealed, would impose harsh penalties. 1 2 These
sources understandably demand an unqualified assurance their cooperative relationship with the U.S. will remain private." 3
One point the 1979 attack on the American embassy in Tehran,
Iran, should have dramatically driven home is that foreign service, be
it for either intelligence gathering or purely diplomatic purposes, can
be extremely hazardous. Indeed, Philip Agee's activities took on special significance during the hostage crisis which followed the seizure
107. Id. Citing to previous congressional actions, the Court stated: "History eloquently
attests that grave problems of national security and foreign policy are by no means limited to
time of formally declared war." Id. at 303. Agee's operation was nothing less than a private
counter-intelligence agency. Agee used his prior contacts from his days with the CIA in order to
elicit information. He also recruited collaborators from foreign countries, training them in clandestine techniques, in order to expose CIA "covers." Id. at 284. Agee readily admitted they
were likely to seriously injure national security. Id. at 287.
108. Id. at 309-10 (quoting Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160 (1963)).
109. See Snepp, 444 U.S. at 512 n.7.
110. Id. at 512.
111. See 128 CONG. REc. S1169 (daily ed. Feb. 25, 1982) (statement of Senator Goldwater). See also S. REP. No. 201, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 20, reprintedin 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 145, 153.
112. See 128 CONG. REC. S1169 (daily ed. Feb. 25, 1982) (statement of Senator
Goldwater).
113. Id.
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of the American embassy in Iran on November 4, 1979.114 The captors, with the official blessing of the Iranian government, held over
fifty American citizens, many of whom were diplomats and some of
whom were alleged to be CIA agents. Government affidavits show
Agee made contact with the captors, urged them to demand certain
CIA documents, and offered to travel to Iran to analyze the documents.1 1 A government affidavit also described an earlier report of
Agee being invited to travel to Iran in order to participate in a "Revolutionary Tribunal" to pass judgment on the hostages.1 16
Moreover, Philip Agee has reportedly relied on rosters of U.S.
diplomatic personnel to discover his "spies.'' 1 One can only speculate on the number of innocent diplomats included on the rolls of
"suspected CIA agents" printed in CounterSpy magazine or the Covert Action Information Bulletin. By contrast, one need only look at
historical precedent to appreciate the grave danger in which these
individuals and their families were placed.""
2. The Interest in Free Speech
In Haig, the court clearly found the government's interest compelling. The New York Times decision offers abundant evidence of
continued judicial support for a national security exception. The case
should also serve, however, as a reminder that under certain circumstances the public's interest in free speech and a free press will outweigh the government's concern with security.
While the press has long been considered a type of representative
or agent of the public,119 the right of journalistic access to information concerning government activities is qualified. The press enjoys
only those same rights of access to information as does the public at
large.1 20 While the press is generally free to report what it sees and
hears within the public domain, the press has no inherent right of
114. See Agee v. Vance, 483 F. Supp. 729 "(D.D.C. 1980).
115. N.Y. Times, Dec. 24, 1979, § A, at 6, col. 5.
116. See Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 286 n.8 (1981).
117. Frank & Eisen, BalancingNational Security and Free Speech, 14 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L.
& POL.339, 354 (1982). Agee has reportedly relied on published, unclassified rosters of diplomatic personnel such as the State Department's Biographical Register, which was publicly
available until 1974. See Simpson v. Vance, 648 F.2d 10, 11 (D.C. Cir. 1980). See also 128 CONG.
REc. S2292 (daily ed. Mar. 17, 1982) (statement of Sen. Moynihan) (government provides only
"nominal cover ... for American intelligence operatives").
118. See supra notes 19-30 and accompanying text.
119. See, e.g., Cable News Network, Inc. v. American Broadcasting Co., 518 F. Supp.
1238, 1244 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (first amendment rights held by both the public at large and the
press, with the press acting as a representative or agent of the public).
120. United States v. Cianfrani, 573 F.2d 835, 861 (3d Cir. 1978), overruled on other
grounds, 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
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access to information not available to the public. 2 ' This necessarily
generates disputes as to exactly when information enters the public
domain.'2 2
Several cases have held that where truthful information has been
placed in the public domain by either open trial or public record, the
press cannot be prohibited from publishing it. 2 ' This situation is,
however, easily distinguishable from the case of covert agent identities. The government continuously takes affirmative actions to keep
1 24
these identities out of any public record.
Admittedly, many of the identities are learned through prior security leaks, and consequently the information disseminated by the
likes of Agee and Wolf may have already fallen into foreign hands.
Nevertheless, one need not inescapably conclude that the government has no legitimate interest in preventing their further communication.12 While foreign operatives may often be aware of classified
information, it cannot be assumed this is always the case. While most
nations in today's world do have some established system for intelligence gathering, 1 26 it seems rather safe to assume most governments
121. Id. at 861. See also Medico v. Time, Inc., 509 F. Supp. 268, 279 (E.D. Pa. 1980),
aff'd, 643 F.2d 134 (3d Cir.) (press' right to publish information is separable from a right to
gather information), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 836 (1981).
122. See generally United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis.) (defendant insisted that all data had been obtained from the public domain and Government
claimed that even if the individual bits of data were in the public domain, the compiled reports
were not), appeal dismissed, 619 F.2d 819 (7th Cir. 1979).
123. See, e.g., Smith v. Daily Mail Pub. Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979); Cox Broadcasting
Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 495 (1975).
124. The entire point of classifying documents as part of a larger overall security procedure is to prevent any problem with claims of public information. The Freedom of Information
Act does not apply to classified documents. Yet the realist must acknowledge there is no foolproof system of internal security. The CIA's experience with Mr. Agee, a former CIA employee,
is probative on that point. Even Agee's written oath of secrecy did not prevent him from exposing secret government information at will upon resignation from the agency. The agreement
Agee had signed was equivalent to the one upheld in Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 508
(1980). Despite the finding in Agee v. Central Intelligence Agency, 500 F. Supp. 506, 509
(D.D.C. 1980), that the valid agreement had been flagrantly violated and despite the granting of
an injunction against Agee, he continued to expose covert agent's abroad. See supra note 27-31
and accompanying text.
125. But see Note, Constitutionalityof the Indentities ProtectionAct, supra note 10, at
747 (government would lose its interests in restraining further publication under such a
scenario).
126. "Every major nation in the world has an intelligence service. . . . It is impossible for
a government wisely to make critical decisions about foreign policy and national defense without the benefit of dependable foreign intelligence." Snepp, 444 U.S. at 512 n.7. Moreover, it is
not hard to fathom a situation in which American journalists with their numerous contacts
within the federal bureaucracy are able to discover information by asking the right people. A
"diplomat" from the Soviet Embassy, on the other hand, might not be extended the same confidences. For example, in United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979),
part of the data compiled was reportedly gathered simply by going to the Department of En-
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do not have sufficient contacts to pick up every particle of data
leaked from CIA files. Historical facts seem to support this stance.
Not until Agee and Wolf made their exposures were the attacks
launched upon U.S. personnel in Jamaica and Greece. 127 When dedicated persons compile such leaks into an easily accessible format, it is
of very little comfort to say some governments may have already
known.

12

8

Government watchdogs frequently decry restrictions on speech
such as the instant Act on the grounds they chill first amendment
rights and discourage exposures of impropriety and illegality within
government. The fear the CIA will use the statute as a ticket to run
rampant and trample the first amendment rights of its opponents by
threatening whistle blowers with prosecution is, however, exaggerated. 129 First of all,. informed debate on national security and the CIA
does not hinge on the disclosure of the names of individual agents at
the lowest levels of the Agency's hierarchy.1 30 The purpose of debate
is to bring issues, such as the CIA's controversial actions abroad, to
light and direct the public eye toward them. Knowing the names and
license plate numbers of each individual agent will not further this
end. 3 1 This is analogous to the present national debate on nuclear
preparedness. While an informed electorate needs to know the nation's capability to engage in nuclear warfare, the electorate does not
need to know the exact coordinates of each and every missile silo or
13 2
the composition of nuclear warheads.
Congress has directly addressed the concern that the Act will
serve to discourage exposures of illegality and impropriety in
America's covert operations. In drafting the Act, Congress unequivocally stated that the Act was not intended as a shield against the
ergy and talking to unsuspecting officials.
127. See supra notes 19-26 and accompanying text.
128. In addition to his magazine Counter Spy, which named suspected CIA agents as a
regular feature, Agee also published several books. See DIRTY WORK. THE CIA IN WESTERN
EuRoPE (P. Agee & L. Wolf eds. 1978); DIRTY WORK 2: THE CIA IN AFRICA (E. Ray, W. Schaap,
K. Van Meter & L. Wolf eds. 1979).
129.

See, e.g., Note, Constitutionalityof the Identities Protection Act, supra note 10, at

752-53; Note, Identities Protection Act: Constitutionalityof Section 601(c), supra note 10, at
505-06.
130. See, e.g., Note, Constitutionalityof the Identities ProtectionAct, supra note 10, at
752-53; Note, Identities Protection Act: Constitutionalityof Section 601(c), supra note 10, at
505-06.
131. See S. REP. No. 201, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 16, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 145, 160. But see Note,' Constitutionality of the Identities Protection Act, supra
note 10, at 752-53; Note, Identities Protection Act: Constitutionalityof Section 601(c), supra

note 10, at 505-06.
132. See United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990, 994 (W.D. Wis.), appeal
dismissed, 610 F.2d 819 (7th Cir. 1979).
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exposure of improprieties.'
Section 602 of the Act 3 4 incorporated
this intent into the law by setting out several defenses to the Act
which a defendant could raise in any prosecution. These defenses include the prior release of the identity by the government, the release
of the information directly to Senate or House Intelligence Committees, or the disclosure only of one's own status as an agent. 's5 The
provision for allowing free disclosure to congressional oversight committees, members of which are authorized to receive classified information, insures that the vital first amendment policing technique of
13
whistleblowing is not stiffled.
Some critics of the Act have insisted labeling the identification of
agents as unnecessary to an informed debate is an unacceptable position. 3 7 One fear of these critics is that the term "identify" as it is
used in the Act is so broad as to trigger the Act whenever any debate
on specific covert activities is attempted. 38 Although legitimate in
theory, this position ignores the built-in safeguards of the Act. The
identification requirement is only one of six elements which must be
proven.1' 9 These additional elements assure that the Act's coverage is
narrow enough to avoid a chilling affect on legitimate debate. Moreover, it is vital that the Act address itself to methods of identification
other than the explicit publication of names. If names were the limit
of its coverage, the Act could be easily circumvented. 14 0 One cannot
realistically say that the publication of an agent's address or license
number is any less effective an identification than a name or that it is
any less likely to precipitate a threat of targeting. Clearly, the Act
must at least cover the functional equivalent of names.
The competing factors involved in the Act clearly balance out in
133. See S. REP. No. 201, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 23, reprinted in 1982 U.S.

CODE CONG.

&

AD. NEWS 145, 167.

134. See Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-200, § 602, 1982
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (96 Stat.) 122-23 (to be codified at 50 U.S.C. § 422). Section 602
of the Act lays out defenses available under it and provides channels for the disclosure of improprieties. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. § 602(2)(c).
137. See Note, Constitutionality of the Identities ProtectionAct, supra note 10, at 75253; Note, Identities ProtectionAct: Constitutionalityof Section 601(c), supra note 10, at 50506.
138. See Note, Constitutionalityof the Identities ProtectionAct, supra note 10, at 75253; Note, Identities ProtectionAct: Constitutionalityof Section 601(c), supra note 10, at 50506.
139. See S. REP. No. 201, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 20, reprintedin 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 145, 164.
140. See supra notes 22-30 and accompanying text. Louis Wolf, in addition to names,
revealed addresses, telephone numbers and license numbers and car descriptions of the alleged
agents in Jamaica.
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favor of its validity. Given the magnitude of the dangers involved and
the questionable worth of the identities to any informed debate on
U.S. covert activities abroad, the government should carry its burden
of proof. Plainly, this law promotes a compelling state interest.
B. The Clear and Present Danger Test
The clear and present danger test examines the constitutional validity of statutes in a manner analogous to the compelling interest
test. Both weigh conflicting dangers and balance the interests involved, thereby dealing with many of the same factors.14 ' Nevertheless, although some courts tend to overlap the two concepts, the clear
and present danger doctrine has developed separately. 42
The most famous exposition of this doctrine was made by Justice
Holmes in Schneck v. United States. 43 In his opinion, he pointed
out that even "the most stringent protection of free speech would not
protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a
panic." 44 Holmes felt the relevant inquiry was whether the speech
created a clear and present danger of substantive evils which Congress had the authority to prevent. 14 5 This "rule of reason" formed
14 6
the foundation for a large body of subsequent case law.

In Whitney v. California,47 the Court refined the doctrine, re-

quiring proof that reasonable grounds existed to believe a serious evil
would imminently occur if the speech were not suppressed. Justices
Brandeis and Holmes joined in a noted concurrence 148 in Whitney
and made it clear that fear of serious injury alone was not sufficient
141. For example, the court in United States v. Progressive, Inc. 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D.
Wis. 1979) talked primarily in terms of balancing the interests in deciding whether to prohibit
the publication of hydrogen bomb data. While this case could arguably fit under the compelling
interest line of cases, it would seem the clear and present danger test was implicit in the court's
line of reasoning. In the intelligence arena, a similar balancing would have to take place. See
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 580 (1951) (Black, J., dissenting) (according to Justice
Black, clear and present danger was simply another technique for balancing competing
interests).
142. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam); Dennis v. United
States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927); Gitlow v. New York,
268 U.S. 652 (1925); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). But see Linde, "Clear and
Present Danger"Reexamined: Dissonance in the BrandenburgConcerto, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1163
(1970) (suggesting that clear and present danger should be rejected as a test for determining
the validity of laws that punish speech).
143. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
144. Id. at 52.
145. Id.
146. See United States v. Schneiderman, 102 F. Supp. 87, 95 (S.D. Cal. 1951); Schaefer v.
United States, 251 U.S. 466, 482-83 (1920) (Brandeis, J., concurring). See also supra note 142.
147. 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
148. Id. at 372 (Brandeis & Holmes, J.J., concurring).
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to justify suppression of free speech. 149 As the Justices noted, "[m]en
feared witches and burnt women. It is the function of speech to free
men from the bondage of irrational fears."' 15 0
In Brandenburg v. Ohio,' 51 the Supreme Court seemed to develop
the clear and present danger doctrine into a two-prong test.' 52 This
seemingly black-letter test provided that a statute restricting advocacy would be upheld against constitutional attack only where such
advocacy is (1) directed at inciting or producing imminent lawless
action and (2) is likely to incite or produce such action. 5 3 Many experts have considered the Brandenburgtwo-prong test as an authori54
tative statement of the modern clear and present danger doctrine.
The Brandenburg formulation, however, includes a number of builtin obstacles hindering its application to the Intelligence Identities
Protection Act.
As the history of murders and attempted murders following many
of the exposures indicates, the identification of covert agents is arguably likely to produce lawless action. If so, such identifications may
well satisfy the second prong of the Brandenburg test. The first
prong of the test, however, presents more serious difficulties. Under
the first prong, it must be shown that such disclosures were directed
at inciting imminent lawless behavior. Evidence to support this contention is not easily obtainable. It might, however, be drawn from
public statements such as Agee's announcement of his intent to drive
U.S. agents out of their stations and destroy the CIA as an entity. 55
Alternatively, a present intent might be implied from the speaker's
knowledge of such conduct provoking acts of violence in the past. 5 '
Even if the disclosures are proven to be directed at inciting violence, additional problems exist in labeling the disclosures as "advocacy." Whether the Brandenburgtest is even applicable in situations
where speakers attempt to incite violence or illegal conduct by using
language not literally calling for such actions is unclear. 57 It cannot
149.
150.
151.

152.
(1981).

Id. at 376.
Id.
395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
See E. BARRET & W. COHEN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASES AND MATERIAL 1123 n.a

153. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.
154. See E. BARREr & W. COHEN, supra note 152, at 1138, 1141-42.
155. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 283 n.2 (1981); see also Identities ProtectionAct: Constitutionality of Section 601(c), supra note 10, at 480 n.2.
156. See supra notes 19-30 and accompanying text. See also Reynolds v. United States,
98 U.S. 145 (1878) (every man presumed to intend the necessary and legitimate consequences
of what he knowingly does).
157. See Brandenburg,395 U.S. at 447. See also Note, Identities ProtectionAct: Constitutionality of Section 601(c), supra note 10, at 494.
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be assumed listing names qualifies as "advocacy" under Brandenburg.158 Likewise, even assuming naming names can qualify as advocacy, it remains unclear whether the advocacy is aimed at a sufficiently definite group to qualify under Brandenburg.59 With each
step in the analysis, Brandenburg's applicability to the Act becomes
increasingly tenuous.
The Brandenburg test, however, must be put into perspective.
The per curiam decision's pronouncement of a two-prong test was
dicta, and the test was never meant to be read as an exclusive
formula for determining constitutionality. 60 As the Supreme Court
stated eight years later in Landmark Communication, Inc. v. Virginia, 6 " the mechanistic application of a technical test is questionable at best. The clear and present danger test was never intended to
become a technical legal definition or to convey a rigid formula for
adjudicating cases. 62 Rather, the clear and present danger test requires courts to make individual inquiries into the imminence and
magnitude of the danger claimed in each case. The character of the
evil and its likelihood is then balanced against first amendment
rights and the possibility of any less restrictive measures serving the
63
state's interests equally well.1
In United States v. Progressive,'" the Court considered a situation analogous to the present one. The United States sought an injunction against the publishers of The Progressive to prevent the
publication of allegedly classified data contained in an article entitled
"The H-Bomb Secret: How We Got It, Why We're Telling It."'6 5 As
much of the data on CIA agents has been, the data in Progressive
had reportedly been pieced together primarily from scattered sources
within the public domain. 6 The government argued such disclosures
67
were, nevertheless, prohibited under the Atomic Energy Act.
In evaluating the case before it, the Court engaged in a balancing
analysis and examined a number of factors. While the article was not
158. See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. 444.
159. See Note, Identities Protection Act: Constitutionalityof Section 601(c), supra note
10, at 493-94.
160. Id. at 497.
161. 435 U.S. 829 (1978).
162. Id. at 842.
163. Id. at 843.
164. 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis.), appeal dismissed, 610 F.2d 819 (7th Cir. 1979). See
United States v. Josephson, 165 F.2d 82, 91 (2d Cir. 1948) (when speech clearly and presently

presents an immediate danger to fiational security, protection of first amendment stops and
Congress may legislate).
165. Progressive, 467 F. Supp. at 991.

166. Id. at 993. *
167. Id. at 991. See also Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C, §§ 274(b), 2280 (1982).
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deemed to provide a "do-it-yourself guide to the hydrogen bomb,"
the piece could have conceivably provided sufficient data to certain
foreign powers to accelerate their progress in developing nuclear
weapons.' 8 The Progressive Court found no satisfactory reason why
the public needed to know technical details on the construction of a
nuclear warhead in order to carry on an informed debate on nuclear
proliferation. 6 9 The Court distinguished New York Times by pointing to the specific statute involved in Progressive. 70 The lack of such
a clear legislative expression was a critical factor in New York
Times. 17 ' Finally, the Court found the harm that could result from
the publication of the article far outweighed any interests protected
by the first amendment.
In referring to the disparity of risk involved, the Progressive
Court analogized that "somehow it does not seem that the right to
life and the right not to have soldiers quartered in your home can be
of equal import in the grand scheme of things.' 1 72 In the same sense,
a weighing of the right of an individual to life, be he diplomat or CIA
agent, against the interests of others in publishing classified information at will, information too diminimous to be useful in furthering
meaningful public debate, leans heavily toward the prevention of disclosure. In light of the same considerations previously discussed in
the context of a compelling interest analysis, the Act appears to
sucessfully navigate the clear and present danger doctrine as well.
The substantial harm to United States national security and the significant threat to life and limb of American operatives serving their
country abroad clearly satisfy the requirements of magnitude and inevitability which permit governmental interference with free
73
speech.
C. Other Attacks on the Act
Even assuming the government carries its burden of proof, critics
of the Act are quick to point out a statute will still fail to meet the
requirements of the first amendment if either its intent standard is
168. 467 F. Supp. at 993.
169. Id. at 994. Moreover, the court observed that the defendant's position against nuclear proliferation would be harmed, not aided, by the publication of the article. Id.
170. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1982).
171. 467 F. Supp. at 994. See supra notes 99-103 and accompanying text. Judge Warren
further stated, that in his opinion, the test enunciated by two of the New York Times Justices,
namely grave, direct, immediate, and irreparable harm to the United States, had been satisfied
by the government in Progressive. 467 F. Supp. at 996.
172. Id. at 995.
173. See supra notes 147-50 and accompanying text.
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defective or it is overbroad. 1 7 4 Commentators have charged that the
Act suffers from both maladies. 17 5 The intent standard will be examined first.
Commentators have argued that section 601(c) does not require
specific intent, and that the requirement of intentional disclosure is
constitutionally insufficient.1 76 As originally reported from the House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Act required disclosures under section 601(c) be made "in the course of an effort to
identify and expose covert agents with an intent to impair or, impede
the foreign intelligence activities of the United States by the fact of
such exposures. 1 77 Prior to passage, however, the Act was amended
and this specific intent standard was replaced with the reasonable
belief standard which now exists.7 8
According to the House Conference Committee report, the
amendment was intended, at least in part, to realign the elements of
proof required at trial in order to safeguard journalists who do not
"name names," but who otherwise engage in heated criticism of the
CIA. 1 9 Fearing that the original language might be applicable to such
journalists, the standard was changed from an intent to impede U.S.
intelligence activities to an intent to identify covert agents.8 0°
Whether this realignment utterly obliterated the specific intent requirement of section 601(c) is unclear. Even assuming it does so, at
least facially, the statute need not be deemed terminally defective.
In Scales v. United States,""' the Supreme Court invoked the
doctrine of constructive intent to save the membership clause of the
Smith Act from constitutional attack. The Smith Act, inter alia,
174. Various criminal statutes have been constitutionally upheld and interpreted as not
requiring the element of intent. See, e.g., State v. Houghtaling, 181 So. 2d 636 (Fla. 1965)
(upholding law prohibiting sale of unregistered securities); Simmons v. State, 151 Fla. 778, 10
So. 2d 436 (1942) (upholding statutory rape law). These crimes were generally classified as
crimes mala prohibita, and simply doing the act was considered punishable. An exception exists, however, where the statute would tend to chill the exercise of first amendment rights. In
such a case, intent is generally required.
A regulation affecting first amendment rights is overbroad when it unnecessarily sweeps
beyond activities constitutionally subject to regulation and invades the area of protected freedoms. NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964); International Soc'y for Krishna v. City of
Houston, 482 F. Supp. 852, 863 (S.D. Tex. 1979), rev'd on other grounds, 689 F.2d 541 (5th Cir.
1982).
175. See, e.g., Note, Constitutionalityof the Identities ProtectionAct, supra note 10, at
750-53.
176. Id. at 752-53.
177. See HR. RFP. No. 221, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 617, reprintedin 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. &
An. NEws 171.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. 367 U.S. 203 (1961).
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makes the acquisition or holding of a knowing membership in any
organization advocating the violent overthrow of the United States
government a felony. 18 2 The Scales Court held that while the clause
did not expressly contain a specific intent standard, such a standard
was to be fairly implied. 8 3 The constructive intent doctrine is as
readily applicable to the Intelligence Act.' Yet even the saving doctrine of "constructive intent4' may not be necessary. The intent standards of the Intelligence Act and certain sections of the espionage
statutes are strikingly similar. 85 For example, section 793 of the espionage statutes, dealing with the gathering, transmitting, or losing of
defense information, provides for convictions of persons who do certain listed acts "for the purpose of obtaining information respecting
the national defense with intent or reason to believe that the information is to be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation ..
."I86 In 1941, this statute was upheld as a constitutional exercise of federal power. 8 7 Thus a court has
available both a favorable judicial interpretation of similar legislation
and the doctrine of constructive intent to uphold the Intelligence
Act.
The Act may also face future challenges on grounds of overbreadth. 18 8 A statute is overbroad when it sweeps within its gamut
not only legitimately restricted activity, but also activities protected
by the first amendment. 8 Significantly, the Court's fear of a possible
chilling effect on the exercise of legitimate constitutional rights is so
strong that even a person whose actual conduct was validly proscribed in accordance with constitutional law can attack legislation. A
defendant may argue that the Act is overbroad in scope by using hypothetical situations at the periphery of statutory meaning. 90 If the
182.
183.
184.

18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1982).
367 U.S. at 221-22, 229-30.
See The Intelligence Protection Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-200, § 601(c), 1982 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (96 Stat.) 122 (to be codified at 50 U.S.C. § 421(c)).
185. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 793(a) ("whoever, for the purpose of obtaining information
respecting the national defense with intent or reason to believe that the information is to be
used to the injury of the United States, or to the advantage of any foreign nation.
... ) with
The Intelligence Protection Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-200, § 601(c), 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS (96 Stat.) 122 (to be codified at 50 U.S.C. § 421(c)).
186. 18 U.S.C. § 793(a) (1982).
187. See Gorin v. United States, 312 U.S. 19 (1941) (vagueness challenge defeated).
188. See, e.g., Note, Constitutionalityof the Identities ProtectionAct, supra note 10, at
752-53.
189. See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97 (1940); Mid-Atlantic Accessories Trade v.
State of Maryland, 500 F. Supp. 834, 847 (D. Md. 1980); International Soc'y for Krishna v. City
of Houston, 482 F. Supp. 852, 863 (S.D. 1979), rev'd on other grounds, 689 F.2d 541 (5th Cir.
1982).
190. See People v. Lerner, 90 Misc. 2d 513, 514, 394 N.Y.S.2d 514, 515 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
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court accepts the defendant's arguments, the statute will fail unless
either it is the least drastic means available to address the problem,
or the court can place a limiting construction upon the law.' 9 '
Critics argue that even if the declarations targeted by the Act can
be constitutionally proscribed, the wording of the law lends itself to
extension beyond that valid scope of control. 192 Even the broadest
provision of the Act, however, specifies that six separate elements
must be proven before conviction. 93 These elements act in concert to
form a line of barriers against extensions beyond the narrow sights of
the Act.
Even assuming, arguendo, that the Act were to be found facially
overbroad, the analysis would not end there. As with the intent analysis, there are often saving constructions which may be applicable to
otherwise overbroad statutes.' A cardinal principle of statutory construction is, when faced with two possible interpretations of the law,
that the court has a plain duty to adopt a saving construction rather
than one which would render the Act constitutionally null and
void.' 9 5 In Broadrick v. Oklahoma,9 6 the Supreme Court reaffirmed
1977). But see Veterans of Foreign Wars, Post 4264 v. City of Steamboat Springs, 195 Colo. 44,
575 P.2d 835 (outside of first amendment setting, a defendant may not attack statute on the
ground that it could conceivably be unconstitutionally applied in situations not before the
court), appeal dismissed, 439 U.S. 809 (1978).
191. Collin v. Smith, 447 F. Supp. 676, 692 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978).
192. See, e.g., Note, Constitutionalityof the Identities ProtectionAct, supra note 10, at
752-53.
193. See, e.g., The Intelligence Protection Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-200, § 601(c), 1982
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws (96 Stat.) 122 (to be codified at 50 U.S.C. § 421(c)). In a successful prosecution under § 602(c), the government would have to prove:
(1) an intentional digclosure of information identifying the covert agent;
(2) the disclosure was made to an individual unauthorized to receive classified
information;
(3) the person making the disclosure knew the information did identify and disclose
a covert agent;
(4) the person disclosing knew the United States was taking affirmative measures to
conceal the agent's affiliation;
(5) the disclosure was made in the course of a pattern of activities intended to identify and expose covert agents;
(6) the person had reason to believe such activities would impair or impede the foreign intelligence activities of the United States.
Id. See S. REP. No. 201, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 20, reprintedin 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
145, 164.
194. See Dowbrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 497 (1965); Home Box Office, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 531 F. Supp. 987, 991 (D. Utah 1982).
195. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973). See also Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951); Lovell v. Griffin, 303
U.S. 444 (1938); Labor Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin, 302 U.S. 1, 30 (1937).
196. 413 U.S. 601 (1973).
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this principle and added, because the application of overbreadth is
manifestly strong medicine, that overbreadth is to be utilized only as
a last resort and only if it is substantial. 197 The determination of the
substantiality of the overbreadth is to be made in light of the statute's plainly legitimate sweep. 19s Even partial invalidation, the Court
continued, may be preferable to full invalidation if a limiting construction cannot be found.'
A saving construction or partial invalidation, however, should be
unnecessary here. In drafting the Act, Congress expressly examined
case law in search of guidance. 0 0 As a result, the Act was drawn as
narrowly as possible. Its provisions were generalized only to the extent necessary to assure the Act's effectiveness.20 ' Further limiting
the provisions of section 601(c) would have allowed disclosers to easily circumvent the statute.20 2 Given this conscious effort to narrow
the scope of the Act, as well as the pressing concerns that made its
protections necessary, the Act should survive any attacks for overbreadth. Moreover, even if the Act were found to suffer from overbreadth nearing the realm of substantiality, a limiting construction
could no doubt be applied consistently with legislative intent.
V. CONCLUSION

The Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982 is by no means
a universal panacea. The list of infirmities arguably present within its
text is substantial,2 3 and the Act will have to face the grilling scrutiny due any statutory restriction of free speech. In light of this, the
intelligence agent in Paris or Managua may be sleeping no sounder.
In evaluating the Act's constitutionality, however, the Court should
acknowledge the pressing threat to national security with which the
197. Id. at 612-15.
198. Id. at 615.
199. Id. at 613.
200. See S. REP. No. 201, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 15, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 145, 159 (referred to the Broadrick principles as having guided the committee in
considering the Act's constitutionality).
201. See supra notes 21-30 and accompanying text.
202. See supra notes 21-30 and accompanying text.
203. In addition to the issues discussed herein, the Act suffers from several other imperfections. See Note, Open Secrets: Protectingthe Identity of the CIA's Intelligence Gatherers
in a FirstAmendment Society, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 1723 (1981). The Act fails to protect domestic
intelligence sources. Id. at 1769. It does nothing to lessen the threat of "gray mail" when
charges are brought by the government. See Note, supra note 35, at 703-04. By failing to protect persons erroneously listed, the statute implicitly acknowledges, upon the initiation of prosecution, the person named as accurately pegged. Id. Thereby, the Act solidifies the correctly
named agent as a target by corroborating the exposure. Id. Moreover, it applies only after the
identity is exposed, thus punishing the culprit, but only after he has opened the bottle and
allowed the genie to escape. Id. at 704.
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Act was intended to cope.
In order to adequately deal with the shadowy world of espionage
and counter-espionage, the Act must necessarily contain some degree
of generality. To expect otherwise would be beyond the realm of reasonableness. The appraising court should recognize this and grant the
statute all the leeway the Constitution allows. Given either the compelling interest or the clear and present danger test, the government
should meet its burden of proof and the Act should prevail in the
balancing of interests. Correspondingly, it should also transcend any
broadside attacks on the grounds of either constitutional overbreadth
or a defective intent standard. If the Act is eventually upheld in the
inevitable court challenge to come, then both our agents and our allies abroad may well sleep just a bit sounder after all.
ROBERT
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